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Abstract
Classic network utility maximization problems are usually solved assuming all information is available, implying
that information not locally available is always truthfully reported. This may not be practical in all scenarios, especially
in distributed/semi-distributed networks. In this paper, incentive for truthful reporting in network optimizations with
local information is studied. A novel general model for extending network utility maximization (NUM) problems to
incorporate local information is proposed, which allows each user to choose its own objective locally and/or privately.
Two specific problems, i.e., a user-centric problem (UCP) and a network-centric problem (NCP), are studied. In the
UCP, a network center aims to maximize the collective benefit of all users, and truthful reporting from the users
regarding their local information is necessary for finding the solution. We show that the widely-adopted dual pricing
cannot guarantee truthful information reporting from a user unless the resource is over-supplied or the price is too high
for this user to afford. In the NCP, the network center has its own objective and preferred solution, and incentive needs
to be provided for the users to adopt the solution it prefers. Truthful reporting from users is necessary for the center
to determine the incentives and achieve its solution. For two-user and multiuser cases, we propose two mechanisms
to motivate truthful reporting from users while guaranteeing nonnegative utility gains for both the users and the
center. A case study on underlay D2D communication illustrates the application of the UCP and NCP. Simulations
are conducted for the D2D application to validate the analytical results and demonstrate the proposed mechanisms.
Index Terms
incentive mechanism, network utility maximization, truthful local information reporting, underlay D2D
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Network utility maximization (NUM) problems have been studied in many applications including sensor networks,
vehicular networks, cellular networks, and smart grids [1] - [5]. Most of these studies adopt an optimization
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2perspective, which focuses on the properties of a problem such as its convexity and decomposability, e.g., [6].
Meanwhile, it is generally assumed that information required for finding the solution is available to the corresponding
entities (e.g., the nodes running the optimization algorithm) either locally or through truthful communications. These
assumptions can be well-justified for networks with a central administrator, e.g., cellular networks, or those with
simple capability-limited nodes, e.g., sensor networks.
However, with the increasing popularity of heterogeneous networks and Internet of things (IoT) [7] [8], more
applications tend to be based on a distributed or a semi-distributed network structure [9] [10]. Meanwhile, network
nodes have increasingly more computation, communication, and/or other (e.g., sensing) capabilities. As a result, a
network node may simultaneously possess local information, computation capability for information processing and
decision making, and an individual benefit-maximizing objective. In such scenarios, it can be argued that assuming
the availability of local information while finding the solution to an optimization problem is less practical. After
all, a node is not motivated to share its true information if it cannot expect a benefit by doing so. As a result, the
solution that can be found from an optimization perspective may not be achieved due to the existence of individual
objectives and local information.
The above scenario requires an incentive mechanism to be adopted as it can motivate individual users to truthfully
report their local information while finding the solution.
B. Related Works
Mechanism design is an analytical framework in the field of game theory. It considers the implementation of
desirable system-wide solutions to problems when a solution depends on self-interested agents and the information
for the agents to make decisions is dispersed and locally held [11]. Game theoretic perspectives for modeling
decision making have been adopted in many research works, e.g., [12]- [15]. While game theory typically studies
the outcome of a group of players interacting with each other, mechanism design concerns providing appropriate
incentives for the players so that their interaction can yield a desirable outcome [16], e.g., a preferred solution
to a considered optimization problem. Mechanism design has been adopted in an increasing number of works
in communications and networking, especially in the past five years. In [17], the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism was adopted to maximize social welfare for a smart grid. Iosifidis et al. proposed an iterative
double auction mechanism for efficient mobile data offloading [18]. A tax mechanism based on the classic Groves
mechanism was introduced in [19] to implement dual decomposition so that a user has a diminishing incentive to
report falsely as the algorithm converges. Wu et al. used a game theoretic design in dynamic spectrum access and
proposed a pricing mechanism for users to adopt the social welfare optimizing solution [20]. Jin et al. considered
incentive for cloudlet service provisioning in mobile cloud computing and designed an auction-based mechanism
for effective resource trading [21]. Considering that users have individual objectives and the network has a system-
wide objective, Zheng et al. proposed a gradient-based incentive to motivate truthful information reporting in an
algorithm based on alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) [22]. A price incentive based on dual
variables, referred to as congestion price, was proposed in [23] for finding the optimal bandwidth allocation. Dual
September 10, 2019 DRAFT
3pricing (congestion price) has been adopted in many works, and a recent example is a study on social welfare
maximization in a mobile crowdsensing scenario [24].
An application of interest for the incentive perspective studies is device-to-device (D2D) communications, in
which there can be no traditional network center for D2D links and each user has its own interest. 1 Su et al.
proposed a contract based mechanism to motivate truthful reporting in an overlay D2D resource allocation scenario
[25]. Zhao and Song proposed incentive mechanisms to motivate base station data offloading through underlay D2D
assisted content distribution [26]. A randomized reverse auction was proposed to incentivize content distribution
via D2D communications and offload traffic from the base station [27]. Li et al. designed a double auction-based
mechanism to incentivize cellular users with alternative D2D communication capabilities to switch to D2D [28].
Wang et al. proposed a resource block exchange mechanism in an overlay D2D scenario to reduce interference
experienced by D2D users [29]. Xu et al. exploited an iterative combinatorial auction for resource allocation among
D2D links with the objective of sum-rate maximization [30]. Xu et al. applied mechanism design in [31] for
coordinating D2D users to participate in traffic offloading from the BS. Kebriaei et al. proposed a double auction
to allocate bandwidth in a cellular network with a cognitive D2D user [32]. Hajiesmaili et al. designed an auction
to achieve load balancing considering battery limits of D2D devices [33].
C. Our Contributions
Despite the increasing number of related works, there is no general framework that can model a NUM problem
with local information, to the best of our knowledge. A close example is [22], in which general forms of objective
functions are used for the network and users. However, the model adopts an optimization perspective and does
not capture local information. The objective of this work is to model and study the impact of local information
and incentive in solution finding. Two problems are considered. The first is a user-centric problem (UCP), a NUM
problem with local information in which the network aims to maximize the collective benefit of users. The second is
a network-centric problem (NCP), in which the network aims to maximize its own benefit representing the preference
of the network while the users prefer a different solution, e.g., the solution to the UCP. After investigating the UCP
and the NCP in general forms, the proposed model is applied to underlay D2D communications. The contributions
of this work include the followings.
First, we propose a novel model to capture a NUM problem with local information, in which optimization and
incentive perspectives are connected. The proposed model characterizes the interest of a user through two mappings,
i.e., an objective function and a valuation function. The objective function maps the optimization variable to a metric
such as data rate, energy efficiency, etc. It represents the part that is considered from an optimization perspective.
The valuation function maps the above metric to its corresponding value to a user, which can be local information.
It represents the part that should be handled from an incentive perspective. The model also extends classic NUM
problems by allowing each individual user to determine and adopt its own objective locally and, if needed, privately.
1This is a typical case but it could depend on the specific approach of implementing D2D communications.
September 10, 2019 DRAFT
4Second, dual pricing is studied for the UCP and the insights on when and why dual pricing cannot be used to
guarantee truthful reporting are obtained. Dual pricing is of interest since it relates to both a pricing mechanism from
the incentive perspective and the dual decomposition technique from the optimization perspective. It is observed
in [19] and [34] that dual pricing cannot guarantee truthful reporting in the corresponding problems. However, the
results of this work provide more insights on dual pricing in general resource allocation problems. It is shown that
dual pricing guarantees truthful reporting only when the resource is oversupplied or when a user could not afford
any resource.
Third, we design mechanisms to guarantee truthful reporting when the network has a preferred solution different
from the one accepted by the users. We show that, unless this solution is also preferred by at least one user, no
mechanism can guarantee truthful reporting and specify a condition under which the network-preferred solution
can be achieved. A subsidized exchange mechanism is proposed to motivate truthful reporting and implement the
network-preferred solution in a two-user case. The mechanism provides nonnegative and fair utility gain for both
users and also a nonnegative gain for the network. For the general multiuser case, a much more complicated situation
in which more forms of untruthful reporting exist, we propose an iterative extended subsidized exchange mechanism
to guarantee that truthful reporting is the best choice for any rational user.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network with N users, where a user can be a network node, a communication link, etc. The set
of users is denoted as U = {i}Ni=1. A network center coordinates the resource allocation among users, where the
resource allocated to user i is represented by xi.
A. Objective, Valuation, and Local Information
Each user has an individual objective, such as data rate, energy efficiency, etc. It is assumed that users can have
different objectives. This reflects the fact that users may be associated with different applications in a network. For
instance, users running throughput-sensitive applications can adopt data rate as their performance metric while users
running delay-sensitive applications can adopt delay as their performance metric. Allowing different objectives at
different users introduces flexibility in characterizing and coordinating multiuser networks.
Assume that there are M different objectives and the set of objectives is O = {ol}Ml=1. Denote the objective
chosen by user i as o(i). The mapping from xi to the achieved result on o(i) is denoted as bi(xi). The mapping
bi is determined by standard formulas, e.g., Shannon capacity.
For users i and j with the same objective ol, it can be argued that they may value bi(xi) and bj(xj) differently
even if bi(xi) = bj(xj). For example, the same energy efficiency of 100 bits/Hz/J can be of different values to users
with 8% and 20% respective remaining battery power. This difference reflects different application requirements
and resource availability status, e.g., remaining battery power, at the users. To characterize user i’s valuation of
an achieved objective bi(xi), the valuation function vi(bi) is introduced. Unlike the mapping bi, vi is determined
individually.
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5As aforementioned, a user can choose its own objective and have its unique valuation function based on its
application requirements and other local factors such as its battery power. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the
valuation function vi(bi) and/or the objective ol chosen by user i as local/private information. In addition, while
bi(xi) is given by standard formulas such as the Shannon capacity, parameters in bi(xi), e.g., the channel gain, can
also be local information. While such information is required for solving an optimization problem in the network,
it is not available to the network center unless reported/shared by the users. As a result, truthful reporting on such
information from all users can be necessary for finding the solution to a considered problem. The network center,
which coordinates and manages the network, is assumed to be not selfish and always truthful.
The following two subsections introduce the two problems considered in this work.
B. The User-Centric Problem (UCP)
The network coordinates the resource allocation to maximize the sum-valuation in the network. It is represented
by the following problem:
max
{xi}Ni=1
∑
i
vi(bi(xi)) (1a)
s.t.
∑
i
xi ≤ Xmax (1b)
0 ≤ xi ≤ xmax, ∀i ∈ U , (1c)
where Xmax and xmax are constants. Note that the adoption of the valuation vi(bi) includes the weighted-sum
optimization as a special case when vi(bi(xi)) = αibi(xi), ∀i. Problem (1) also includes the NUM problems with
all users using the same objective, such as a sum-rate optimization problem, as special cases.
Unlike classic NUM problems, local information is captured in this model through the mapping vi and/or the
objective ol chosen by user i. Evidently, solving problem (1), in either a centralized or a distributed approach,
requires all users to truthfully reveal their local information. To solve (1) in a centralized approach, user i needs to
report its chosen objective, the mapping vi(bi), and other local information (e.g., the parameter set) to the center.
To solve (1) in a distributed approach, assuming that the problem is convex and dual decomposition is used, user
i should report its solution to the problem of maximizing vi(bi(xi)) − λxi iteratively, where λ is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with constraint (1b).
If any user reports untruthfully, the solution, assuming that it can be found, might not be the solution to the
original problem, i.e., problem (1). For example, if user l reports vl(bl) instead of vl(bl)
2 while other users report
2This corresponds to the case of a centralized optimization approach. In a distributed optimization approach, the equivalent untruthful reporting
is that user l reports its local solution based on vl(bl) instead of vl(bl) to the center.
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6truthfully, the obtained solution is the solution to the following problem:
max
{xi}Ni=1
vl(bl(xl)) +
∑
i6=l
vi(bi(xi)) (2a)
s.t.
∑
i
xi ≤ Xmax (2b)
0 ≤ xi ≤ xmax, ∀i ∈ U . (2c)
As each user has its own objective and valuation, assuming truthful reporting can be unconvincing. If the solution
to (2) is better than the solution to (1) from the perspective of user l, user l can be motivated to report untruthfully.
Therefore, a mechanism is required to incentivize users to report truthfully. For the UCP, a common pricing
mechanism, i.e., dual pricing [24], [38]- [42], will be studied in details.
C. The Network-Centric Problem (NCP)
While problem (1) is from the perspective of sum-valuation of users, a different solution can be preferred by the
network center. Assume the center prefers the solution to the following problem based on its own objective and
valuation vc(bc(x)):
max
x
vc(bc(x)) (3a)
s.t.
∑
i
xi ≤ Xmax (3b)
0 ≤ xi ≤ xmax, ∀i ∈ U , (3c)
where x = [x1, ..., xN ]. Denote the solution to (3) as {x†i} and the solution to (1) (or any other solution accepted
by all users) as {x⋆i }. While {x†i} could be found without help from the users, convincing the users to adopt {x†i}
instead of {x⋆i } requires incentive. 3 Providing incentive to user i for switching from x⋆i to x†i requires user i to
reveal local information regarding vi(bi(x
⋆
i )) and vi(bi(x
†
i )). A proper mechanism is necessary for the users to
report truthfully. For the NCP, mechanisms are designed to provide incentives for the users to guarantee truthful
reporting while switching from {x⋆i } to {x†i}.
In both the UCP and the NCP, the valuation function vi(bi), ∀i are assumed to be twice differentiable, strictly
concave, nondecreasing, and satisfy vi(0) = 0.
4 Such valuation models the case of decreasing marginal valuation
and is widely used in both classic mechanism design and its applications in the networking field [35]. Examples of
such utilities can be found in [36]. The objective function bi(xi) is twice differentiable and can be either concave
or unimodal and concave in [0, x∗i ], where x
∗
i maximizes bi(xi). Section VI will provide detailed examples.
In the remainder of this paper, the focus will be on mechanism analysis and mechanism design based on the
following two assumptions: i). All users are selfish but not malicious, i.e., they avoid causing an algorithm to diverge;
and ii). A user avoids being identified as untruthful, which can happen if its reports contradict the properties of
vi(bi) mentioned above.
3This is because {x†i } is a suboptimal solution to (1) and generally leads to smaller valuations to a nonempty set of users.
4Most results in this work still apply when the utilities are concave but not strictly concave.
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7III. MECHANISM AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
The concept of mechanism and incentive compatibility is briefly introduced in this section,5 while strategies and
incentives in the considered system model will be described.
A mechanism is a tuple {S1, . . . , SN ,Γ(·)} that consists of a set of possible actions Si for each user and
specifies an outcome based on a social choice function Γ(·) for each possible combination of actions of users [16].6
Specifically, in a quasilinear mechanism, Γ(·) specifies a transfer ti (a payment if ti > 0 or charge if ti < 0) to
user i, which renders user i’s final utility ui to be ui = vi + ti (i.e., its valuation of the outcome plus the transfer).
User i chooses its action from Si based on its local information and the knowledge on how the outcome and
transfer are decided. A common action is to report a value (e.g., a solution, a demand, a quote, etc.). A mechanism
is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if truthful reporting is the best strategy for each user regardless
of strategies used by other users [16]. A mechanism is ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) if truthful reporting is
the best strategy for any user given that other users also report truthfully.
Several metrics are used to evaluate a mechanism. A mechanism is efficient if the outcome maximizes the sum
valuation of all users. A mechanism is individually rational if each user is guaranteed to have a nonnegative utility.
A quasi-linear mechanism is considered budget-balanced if
∑
i ti ≤ 0.
For the UCP, reporting occurs in each iteration of distributed optimization while solving problem (1). Specifically
• Iteration j = 0. Network (center) chooses an initial value λ0 for the Lagrange multiplier λ and broadcast λ0.
• User i, ∀i: expected to report the solution to max (vi(xi)− λjxi) subject to (1c).
• Network (center) sets λj+1 = λj + δ(
∑
i
xi −Xmax) and broadcast λj+1.
• Repeat the above two steps until xji , ∀i converge.
where vi(bi(xi)) is denoted as vi(xi) for brevity.
The sequence of reports {xji}, ∀i determines whether the algorithm can converge 7 and whether the solution
found is the optimal solution to the original problem (1). The strategy of a user is to choose a report xji given the
true xji and λ
j in each iteration j. An example mechanism that specifies the resource allocation outcome and the
transfer is given below 

xi = x˜i, ti = ft(x˜i) if {xji} converge to x˜i, ∀i
xi = 0, ti = 0 otherwise
(4)
where ft(x) is a function for determining transfers.
A common pricing mechanism for distributed solution finding in the literature is dual pricing [24], [38] - [42],
which interprets and applies the dual variable λ in the aforementioned distributed optimization procedure as a
per-unit price. Equivalently, ti = ft(x˜i) = −λx˜i in (4). It can be seen that dual pricing is individually rational and
budget-balanced. However, it is shown by a two-user example in [19] that dual pricing is not incentive compatible
when one user is a leader and another is a follower. It is also shown in [34] that a dual pricing based auction is
5For more details, one can refer to [37].
6An indirect mechanism is assumed here.
7Here the term “converge” refers to “not diverge” but not necessarily “converge to the optimal solution”.
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Fig. 1: Information Exchange in a distributed solution finding
not incentive compatible for improving secrecy capacity. The next section will study the dual pricing mechanism
and the incentive of users under dual pricing in the considered general scenario.
It should be noted that strategies of a user can be extremely rich, i.e., represented by all mapping from
{{xki }jk=0, {λk}jk=0} to xji in iteration j. Even if a user makes a decision in each iteration without using historical
information, its strategy space still consists of all mappings from {xji , λj} to xji in each iteration. However, most of
the strategies would trivially lead an optimization algorithm to diverge. Thus, we limit our consideration to the case
that users report based on a valuation function vi(bi) that possesses the same properties as vi(bi): strictly concave,
twice differentiable, nondecreasing, and vi(0) = 0. The reporting is truthful if vi = vi. Such reporting strategy is
consistent over iterations, allow a distributed algorithm to converge, and is impossible to be identified as untruthful.
IV. INCENTIVE FOR TRUTHFUL REPORTING IN THE UCP: A STUDY ON DUAL PRICING
In this section, dual pricing, as a pricing mechanism for solution finding in distributed optimization, is studied.
The focus is on whether a user would report truthfully, i.e., vi = vi, so that the solution to the original problem
(1) can be found. Notations used in this section are given in Table I.
Based on the assumptions on vi(bi) and bi(xi) in Section II, vi(xi) is twice differentiable in [0, x
max] and either
concave in [0, xmax] or unimodal and concave in [0, x∗i ], where x
∗
i maximizes vi(xi), for any i and any objective
function bi(xi).
Lemma 1: The utility of user i satisfies ui({si, sTR−i }) ≤ ui({sTRi , sTR−i }) for any reporting strategy si such that
λ⋆({si, sTR−i }) > λ⋆({sTRi , sTR−i }), where the strict inequality holds when x⋆i ({si, sTR−i }) > 0.
Proof : Please refer to Section A in Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that, when a user intends to report untruthfully, it should avoid any untruthful reporting strategy
that can unilaterally drive λ up even if it can acquire more resource by using such a strategy.
Lemma 2: User i can unilaterally affect the price through untruthful reporting such that λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i ) < λ
⋆(sTRi , s
TR
−i )
with si 6= sTRi as long as x⋆i (sTRi , sTR−i ) 6= 0.
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9TABLE I: Table of Notations for the UCP
si reporting strategy of user i
s−i combination of strategies of all users except user i
si = sTRi user i report truthfully, i.e., vi = vi
s−i = sTR−i other users report truthfully, i.e., vj = vj ,∀j 6= i
x⋆i ({si, s−i}) resource allocated to user i given {si, s−i}
ui(si, s−i) utility of user i given {si, s−i}
λ⋆(si, s−i) dual price given {si, s−i}
x⋆i ({s
TR
i , s
TR
−i }) x
⋆
i ({si, s−i}) when si = s
TR
i and s−i = s
TR
−i
ui(sTRi , s
TR
−i ) ui(si, s−i) when si = s
TR
i and s−i = s
TR
−i
λ⋆(sTRi , s
TR
−i ) λ
⋆(si, s−i) when si = sTRi and s−i = s
TR
−i
Proof : Please refer to Section B in Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that each user has the ability to unilaterally drive λ down through untruthful reporting as long
as its share of the resource when everyone reports truthfully, i.e., x⋆i (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ), is nonzero.
Lemma 3: Unless
∑
i x
⋆
i (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) < X
max, truthful reporting is not optimal for any user i with x⋆i (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) 6=
0, for any given combination of valuation functions {vi(xi)}∀i, assuming others report truthfully. A x⋆i ∈ (0, x⋆i )
and a corresponding λ⋆ ∈ (0, λ⋆) always exist such that
ui(si,s
TR
−i )=vi(x
⋆
i )−λ⋆x⋆i >vi(x⋆i )−λ⋆x⋆i =ui(sTRi ,sTR−i ), (5)
where x⋆i , x
⋆
i , λ
⋆, and λ⋆ are abbreviations of x⋆i ({si, sTR−i }), x⋆i ({sTRi , sTR−i }), λ⋆(si, sTR−i ), and λ⋆(sTRi , sTR−i ),
respectively.
Proof : Please refer to Section C in Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that an untruthful reporting strategy can result in a smaller share of resource but yield a larger
utility for a user due to a lower price. Such a strategy is related to demand reduction, and discussions on a simpler
discrete case in which resources are multiple indivisible items for sale can be found in [43]. An illustration of
Lemma 3 is shown in Fig. 2, where vi and λixi are the true valuation function and the cost with truthful reporting,
respectively, and vi and λixi are an untruthfully-reported valuation and the corresponding cost, respectively. The
variables ui, u˜i, and ui are the utility of user i with truthful reporting, the utility of user i if vi were the truthful
valuation, and the utility actually acquired by user i with untruthful reporting based on vi, respectively.
Lemma 1 to Lemma 3 provide insights into dual pricing as a mechanism for a distributed resource allocation
problem step by step. First, it is shown by Lemma 1 that dual pricing can prevent untruthful reporting that would
intensify the competition and drive the price λ up. Next, Lemma 2 shows that users that would be allocated a
nonzero share of resource when everyone report truthfully can unilaterally drive λ downward. Lemma 3 shows that
such a user can benefit from driving λ downward when all other users report truthfully except for trivial cases in
which the resource is oversupplied, i.e.,
∑
i x
⋆
i (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) < X
max. The condition that x⋆i 6= 0 in Lemmas 2 and 3
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Fig. 2: An illustration on how a user could benefit from reporting untruthfully. The variable xi represents the
resource allocated to user i. Given any xi, the corresponding y coordinates on the two curves represent the truthful
and untruthful valuations, respectively. The corresponding y coordinates on the two oblique lines stand for the
costs under truthful and untruthful reporting, respectively. The gaps represent utilities of user i (please refer to the
paragraph following Lemma 3).
implies that truthful reporting is optimal for a user when it cannot afford any resource under dual pricing. The
above insights lead to the following remark.
Remark 1: Under dual pricing, reporting truthfully is optimal for a user only when the resource is oversupplied
or when it cannot afford any resource.
Theorem 1: Dual pricing, when used as a pricing mechanism, is not EPIC.
Proof : Combining Lemma 1 to Lemma 3 proves this result.
The results in Lemma 1 to Lemma 3 are obtained without needing to know the specific local valuations of the
users. It implies that a rational user can also obtain the above insights while choosing its reporting strategy and
realize that truthful reporting is unlikely to be optimal.
As dual pricing is not incentive compatible, a different mechanism is needed to guarantee truthful reporting in
a distributed optimization. The extension of classic Groves mechanisms to algorithmic mechanism design can be
adopted here [19]. The mechanism is implemented through an algorithm with dual-decomposition based iterations
while, in addition to their local solutions, users are also required to report their valuations in each iteration. The
network center updates the dual variable, performs the convergence check, and charges each user a VCG based
cost instead of a dual-price based cost at convergence. For any given iteration, the mechanism is not incentive
compatible. However, the mechanism is shown to be asymptotically DSIC, which yields a diminishing return for an
untruthful reporting user as the algorithm proceeds. We remark that the same extension of Groves mechanisms is also
asymptotically DSIC when a projected gradient ascent is used, in which case the coordinator is not computationally
involved but only responsible for checking convergence and executing the final allocation solution. With dual pricing,
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however, the result would be different.
V. INCENTIVE FOR TRUTHFUL REPORTING IN THE NCP: CONDITION AND MECHANISMS
The preceding section investigates incentive for truthful reporting while solving the UCP. This section investigates
incentive for truthful reporting while implementing the solution of the NCP. Recall that the center prefers a different
solution, i.e., {x†i}, from the one accepted by the users, i.e., {x⋆i } in the NCP. The solution {x†i} is the solution to
problem (3). Although the center can solve problem (3) without help from the users, incentives need to be provided
to the users for a consensus to adopt {x†i} instead of {x⋆i }. To determine the incentives, reports from the users
regarding their valuations are necessary, and therefore truthful reporting is a concern.
Denote ν(x) = vc(bc(x)). The study is based on the assumption that, while x
† is optimal to the center, the center
is also willing to adopt any intermediate solution x at the cost of providing transfers {ti} to the users as long as
ν(x) −∑i ti(xi) ≥ ν(x⋆). A mechanism can implement x† if users prefer x† after receiving the transfers, i.e.,
vi(x
†
i ) + ti ≥ vi(x⋆i ), ∀i. Properties such as convexity are not assumed for ν(x) as long as the center can solve
problem (3).
With the above assumptions, whether {x†} can be implemented or not and what mechanism can be used to
implement {x†} are investigated.
Lemma 4: If x†i < x
⋆
i , ∀i, no mechanism can be both incentive compatible and able to specify a condition under
which the implementation of x† is guaranteed.
Proof: Please refer to Section D in Appendix.
Lemma 4 shows that at least one user, in addition to the center, should prefer x†i to x
⋆
i . Otherwise, no mechanism
can be incentive compatible while guaranteeing the implementation of x†.
Next consider the case that x†i < x
⋆
i for a set of i denoted as S1 and x†i > x⋆i for a nonempty set of i denoted
as S2.
Consider a two-user example first. Assume v1(x
⋆
1) > v1(x
†
1) and v2(x
⋆
2) < v2(x
†
2). A subsidized exchange
mechanism (SEM) for motivating users to switch to {x†i} from {x⋆i } is proposed in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm,
Line 3 and Line 4 are executed by the users and the rest by the center.
Lemma 5: The mechanism in Algorithm 1 can implement {x†1, x†2} under the condition αsc ≥ ρ−ϕ. Moreover,
the proposed mechanism is DSIC and individually rational.
Proof: Please refer to Section E in Appendix.
Since {x⋆i } maximizes
∑
i vi(xi), it can be seen that ρ
TR = v1(x
⋆
1) − v1(x†1) > v2(x†2)− v2(x⋆2) = ϕTR since∑
i vi is strictly concave. Consequently, ϕ+αsc ≥ ρ is possible only if αsc > 0 given that ρ ≥ ρTR and ϕ ≤ ϕTR
for any rational users. Therefore, the center must subsidize an exchange for it to be successful, i.e., ϕ+αsc ≥ ρ. In
addition to being DSIC and individually rational, the SEM also gives the center a nonnegative gain after deducting
the subsidy. Specifically, the gain of the center is
pic = sc −
(
ϕ+ αsc − (ρ− αsc)
)
= (1 − 2α)sc + ρ− ϕ > (1 − 2α)sc (6)
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Algorithm 1 Subsidized Exchange Mechanism (SEM)
Input: x†,x⋆
Output: x
1: Calculate sc = ν(x
†)− ν(x⋆) and determine a threshold α ∈ (0, 1/2]
2: Announce x†1 and x
†
2 to users 1 and 2, respectively.
3: User 1 reports ρ, i.e., the compensation it requires to implement x†1, to the center.
4: User 2 reports ϕ, i.e., the price it is willing to pay to implement x†2, to the center.
5: Compare ϕ+ αsc with ρ.
6: if ϕ+ αsc < ρ then
7: abort with x = x⋆
8: else
9: Charge user 2 the amount of ρ− αsc and pay user 1 the amount of ϕ+ αsc
10: x = x†
11: end if
12: return x
where sc = ν(x
†) − ν(x⋆) represents the value of a successful exchange to the center. The terms ϕ + αsc and
ρ − αsc are the amounts that the center pays and receives in SEM, respectively, with the difference being the
subsidy. The inequality follows from the fact that ρ ≥ ρTR ≥ ϕTR ≥ ϕ. The choice of α in (0, 1/2] in Algorithm 1
guarantees that pic > 0 in an exchange.
Insights can be drawn from comparing the cases with and without considering information availability and
incentive. If ρTR and ϕTR were information known to the center, the center could coordinate a successful exchange
as long as sc ≥ ρTR − ϕTR. 8 By contrast, with ρTR and ϕTR being local information, a successful exchange
occurs when αsc ≥ ρTR − ϕTR in SEM. Since α ≤ 1/2, the condition that αsc ≥ ρTR − ϕTR is more stringent
than the condition sc ≥ ρTR − ϕTR. Consequently, the chance of implementing {x†1, x†2} becomes smaller. It
shows that, when ρTR and ϕTR are local information, the center needs to provide more subsidy (compared to
ρTR − ϕTR) to incentivize an exchange. Thus, the more stringent requirement on sc and, as a result, a smaller
chance of implementing {x†i} represent the cost of dealing with local information.
It should be noted that the parameter α must be determined before the center receives ϕ and ρ. The choice of α
corresponds to a trade-off for the center. A smaller α leads to a smaller chance of success in implementing {x†1, x†2}
but a larger pic/sc. By contrast, a larger α increases the chance of success yet leads to a smaller pic/sc for the
center.
Remark 2: The SEM provides an equal and fair utility gain, i.e., ϕTR−ρTR+αsc, to both users in any successful
exchange.
8Specifically, the center could offer ρTR + ǫ to user 1 and charge ϕTR − ǫ from user 2 with an nonnegative ǫ that can be arbitrarily small
or even 0.
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Fig. 3: Illustration of variable relations in iteration l (ESEM).
Remark 3: The benchmark allocation {x⋆i } can be either the solution to problem (1) or any other solution accepted
by both users as long as at least one user prefers {x†i} to {x⋆i } (otherwise Lemma 4 applies).
The next step is to consider a multiuser case. Generally, it is impossible to determine whether {x†i} can be
implemented or not in one shot due to the coupling between ν(x) and vi(xi), ∀i. Therefore, an iterative algorithm
is proposed, as an extension of SEM, in which the center coordinates the users to gradually migrate from {x⋆i }
toward {x†i} through a sequence of subsidized exchanges. The proposed extended subsidized exchange mechanism
(ESEM) is given in Algorithm 2. The algorithm ends up with either the implementation of {x†i} or a solution no
worse than {x⋆i } to all users as well as the center (both with the subsidies taken into account).
Let l represent the iteration index, and xli represent xi in iteration l. Initialize x
0
i = x
⋆
i , ∀i. Define two sets
Sl1 = {i|x†i < xli, i ∈ U} and Sl2 = {i|x†i > xli, i ∈ U}. In the lth iteration, user i, ∀i ∈ Sl1 reports ρli, its loss from
implementing xli − δl compared to implementing xli, and user j, ∀j ∈ Sl2 reports ϕlj , its gain from implementing
xlj+δl compared to implementing x
l
j . For each combination of i ∈ Sl1 and j ∈ Sl2, the center calculates its valuation
of the tentative exchange between users i and j as
θlij = ν(x¯
l+1,(ij))− ν(xl), (7)
where x¯l+1,(ij) = [x¯
l+1,(ij)
1 , . . . , x¯
l+1,(ij)
N ] with
x¯
l+1,(ij)
k =


xlk − δl if k = i
xlk + δl if k = j
xlk otherwise.
(8)
Define Θl = {θlij}. Define
ψlij = α
lθlij + ϕ
l
j − ρli (9)
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and Ψ l = {ψlij}. For any given i ∈ Sl1 and j ∈ Sl2 in iteration l, define the following sets
Ωli = {j|j ∈ Sl2, ψlij > 0} (10a)
Ωlj = {i|i ∈ Sl1, ψlij > 0}, (10b)
For simplicity, define a |Sl1| × |Sl2| matrix Wl with its elements determined by
Wli,j =


1, if j ∈ Ωli
0, otherwise.
(11)
Define
Rli+ = {i|i ∈ Sl1,
∑
j
Wli,j 6= 0} (12)
as the set of row indices corresponding to the rows of Wli,j with at least one nonzero element. With the above
definitions, the ESEM is given in Algorithm 2, in which Line 4 and Line 7 are the steps executed by the users and
others by the center.
Theorem 2: The ESEM in Algorithm 2 is EPIC and individually rational if {αl}∀l is chosen such that {αlθli˜j˜}∀l
is a nonincreasing sequence.
Proof : See Section F in Appendix.
It is worth noting that there exist more forms of untruthful reporting in an iterative procedure than in a one-shot
exchange. Proved to be incentive compatible, ESEM can prevent all of the following cases of untruthful report
including: (i) untruthfully report a larger ρli or φ
l
i in iteration l to achieve larger benefit, (ii) untruthfully report a
smaller ρli or φ
l
i in iteration l to achieve larger benefit, and (iii) skipping an iteration to achieve a larger benefit
when δl changes.
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Algorithm 2 Extended Subsidized Exchange Mechanism (ESEM)
Input: S01, S
0
2,x
†,x⋆
Output: xl
Initialization: Set l = 0, x0i = x
⋆
i , ∀i. Set δ0.
1: while (true) do
2: Determine αl and announces δl to users
3: for User i = 1 to N do
4: if i ∈ Sl1 then
5: Report ρli = vi(x
l
i)− vi(xli − δl) to the center
6: else if i ∈ Sl2 then
7: Report ϕlj = vj(x
l
j + δl)− vj(xlj) to the center
8: end if
9: end for
10: Calculate θlij and ψ
l
ij , ∀i ∈ Sl1, ∀j ∈ Sl2 using (7) and (9). Calculate Wl using (10) and (11).
11: if Wl = 0 then
12: exit with xl
13: end if
14: Set Rli+ as in (12) and R
l
j+ = S
l
2
15: while (Rli+ 6= ∅ and Rlj+ 6= ∅) do
16: Select an i, denoted as i˜, from Rli+ based on a uniform distribution
17: Select a j, denoted as j˜, from Sl2 based on a uniform distribution
18: if W l
i˜,j˜
= 0 then
19: Rli+ = R
l
i+/{i˜}
20: Rlj+ = R
l
j+/{j˜}
21: else
22: Charge user j˜ the amount ρi˜ − αlθli˜j˜
23: Compensate user i˜ the amount ϕj˜ + α
lθl
i˜j˜
24: Set xl+1 = xl, Sl+11 = S
l
1, and S
l+1
2 = S
l
2
25: Update xl+1
i˜
= xl
i˜
− δl and xl+1j˜ = xlj˜ + δl
26: Sl+11 = S
l
1/{i˜} if xl+1i˜ = x
†
i˜
27: Sl+12 = S
l
2/{j˜} if xl+1j˜ = x
†
j˜
28: break the inner while loop
29: end if
30: end while
31: if Rli+ = ∅ or R
l
j+ = ∅ or S
l+1
1 = ∅ then
32: Set l = l + 1 and exit with xl
33: end if
34: Set l = l + 1 and update δl
35: end while
36: return xl
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Fig. 4: The underlay D2D application scenario. The abbreviation DRA stands for D2D reuse area.
VI. APPLICATION ON UNDERLAY D2D COMMUNICATIONS
The modeling, analysis, and mechanisms from the preceding sections can be applied in networks featuring a
distributed/semi-distributed structure in which users have individual utilities and local information. In this section,
the UCP and the NCP will be re-modeled in an application of underlay D2D communications. Other applications in
which the proposed model and results may apply include but are not limited to: spectrum leasing in cognitive radio,
mobile crowdsensing, cooperative data dissemination in vehicular ad-hoc networks, demand response in smart grid,
and cooperative caching.
Consider a cellular network in an urban environment with dense microcells as shown in Fig. 4. An underlay
based D2D communications is adopted, and resource blocks (RBs) for cellular communications are reused by
D2D communications. A microcell is divided into D2D reuse areas, and RBs can be reused by different D2D
links in different reuse areas.9 For cross-area D2D links, e.g., link c in Fig. 4, the D2D link can communicate
when the microcell BS (microBS) can assign an RB that is available in both areas. D2D links associated with
different microBS cannot communicate directly. To control the interference from D2D to cellular and other D2D
communications, two assumptions are made. First, the maximum transmit power allowed for D2D communications,
denoted as pmax, is smaller than that allowed for cellular communications. Second, the total transmit power of all
D2D communications reusing the same RB in each microcell is limited by Pmax.
Denote the kth D2D RB and the set of D2D RBs as bk and B, respectively, and the size of B as NB . Also
denote Lm(bk), k ∈ {1, . . . , NB} as the set of D2D links allocated with RB bk in all areas of microcell m and the
size of Lm(bk) as Lbkm . Let Cm represent the set of all neighbor microcells of microcell m. A D2D link in Lm(bk)
may receive interference from four sources: other D2D links in Lm(bk), D2D links in Ls(bk), s ∈ Cm, cellular
9Considering the fact that diameter of a micro-cell is on the kilometer level while the diameter of D2D communications is mostly 25 meters
or less [30] [44] [45], allowing only one D2D link to communicate on each RB would lead to a waste of spectral resource.
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links using bk in microcell m, and cellular links using bk in microcells in Cm. The received signal of a D2D link
in Lm(bk) is
ym,i =
√
pm,ih
bk
m,ixm,i +
∑
j∈Lm(bk),j 6=i
√
pm,jh
bk
m,j,ixm,j
+
∑
s∈Cm
∑
j∈Ls(bk)
√
ps,jh
bk
s,j,ixs,j +
√
pcmh
c,bk
m,i x
c
m
+
∑
s∈Cm
√
pcsh
c,bk
s,i x
c
s + nm,i, (13)
where xm,i, xm,j , and xs,j represent the transmitted signal of the ith D2D link using bk in microcell m, the jth
D2D link using bk in microcell m, and the jth D2D link using bk in microcell s, respectively. The variables pm,i,
pm,j , and ps,j represent the transmit power of the ith D2D link using bk in microcell m, the jth D2D link using
bk in microcell m, and the jth D2D link using bk in microcell s, respectively. The variables x
c
m, x
c
s, p
c
m, and p
c
s
denote the transmitted signal of the cellular links using bk in microcells m and s, and the corresponding transmit
power of the cellular links, respectively. The variable hbkm,i represents the channel from the target transmitter to
the target receiver of the ith D2D link in microcell m. The variables hbkm,j,i and h
bk
s,j,i represent the interference
channels from the transmitter of the jth D2D link using bk in microcell m and from the transmitter of the jth D2D
link using bk in microcell s to the target receiver of the ith D2D link in microcell m, respectively. The variables
hc,bkm,i and h
c,bk
s,i are the interference channels from the transmitters of the cellular links using bk in microcells m and
s to the target receiver of the ith D2D link in microcell m, respectively. The variable nm,i represents the additive
Gaussian noise.
The first item in (13) is the intended signal, and the second to the fifth items represent the interference from
other D2D links in the same microcell, D2D links in the neighboring cells, the cellular link in the same microcell,
and cellular links in the neighboring microcells, respectively. The channels incorporate Rayleigh fading and large
scale propagation path-loss. It is assumed that D2D links have no preference in particular RBs.
The data rate corresponding to Eq. (13) is given as
rm,i(pm,i) = log
(
1 +
gbkm,ipm,i
σ20 + p
I
m,i
)
, (14)
where gbkm,i = |hbkm,i|2 represents the channel power gain, and
pIm,i =
∑
j∈Lm(bk),j 6=i
pm,jg
bk
m,j,i +
∑
s∈Cm
∑
j∈Ls(bk)
ps,jg
bk
s,j,i
+ pcmg
c,bk
m,i +
∑
s∈Cm
pcsg
c,bk
s,i (15)
is the overall interference power at the receiver of the target D2D link. The variables gbkm,j,i, g
bk
s,j,i, g
c,bk
m,i , and
gc,bks,i represent the channel power gains of h
bk
m,j,i, h
bk
s,j,i, h
c,bk
m,i , and h
c,bk
s,i , respectively. Considering the significant
difference between the coverage of cellular and D2D links, the smaller maximum transmit power for a D2D link,
and the total power constraint for D2D links, it is assumed that cellular communications are the major interferer
of D2D communications. The assumption is appropriate in an urban scenario with dense microcells and small
microcell radius. The interference is in turn modeled as a Gaussian random variable [26].
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The corresponding energy efficiency is given by
em,i(pm,i) =
1
p0m,i + pm,i
log
(
1 +
gbkm,ipm,i
σ20 + p
I
m,i
)
, (16)
where p0m,i represents circuit power consumption. Although the energy efficiency function is nonconvex, it is
unimodal and concave in [0, p∗m,i], where p
∗
m,i maximizes em,i.
With the above setup, each microBS can independently coordinate its D2D links. Accordingly, we can focus on
just one microcell. The microcell index m is neglected when appropriate. Correspondingly, pm,i, rm,i, and em,i
will be denoted as pi, ri, and ei, respectively.
As mentioned in Section II, each link determines its own objective oi, which can be either rate or energy efficiency
in this case, without needing to notify the microBS. Correspondingly, bi(xi) in Section II becomes ri(pi) if link i
has a rate objective or ei(pi) otherwise. The value of a specific rate ri or energy efficiency ei to link i, depending
on the objective, is determined by vi(ri) or vi(ei).
A mircoBS may coordinate its D2D links to maximize the sum-valuation, i.e,
max
{pi,i∈Lm(bk)}
∑
i∈Lm(bk)
vi(pi) (17a)
s.t. 0 ≤ pi ≤ pmax, ∀i ∈ Lm(bk) (17b)∑
i∈Lm(bk)
pi < P
max. (17c)
The above problem could accommodate more constraints, e.g., a minimum rate constraint for D2D links with an
energy efficiency objective, while the results in previous sections can still apply. Nevertheless, the above basic form
is used since the focus is on incentive instead of optimization. Problem (17) corresponds to the UCP, i.e., problem
(1). However, when the D2D links adopt the solution to (17), it is possible that the microBS has preference for a
power allocation solution to a different problem, e.g.,
max
{pi,i∈Lm(bk)}
ν(p) (18a)
s.t. 0 ≤ pi ≤ pmax, ∀i ∈ Lm(bk) (18b)∑
i∈Lm(bk)
pi < P
max. (18c)
where ν(p) with p = [p1, . . . , p|Lm(bk)|] is the microBS’s valuation representing a network preference. Problem
(18) corresponds to the NCP, i.e., problem (3).
The next section will demonstrate the results obtained in the UCP and NCP for this application using the above
models.
VII. SIMULATION EXAMPLES
With the D2D application as an example, this section demonstrates the analysis on dual pricing as well as the
proposed SEM and ESEM in the preceding sections. The common setup for all simulation examples are as follows.
The radius of a cell is 500 meters, and the distance between D2D transceivers is in [5,25] meters. The noise spectral
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Fig. 5: Transmission rates and energy efficiency versus transmit power when 8 D2D links reuse the same RB in a
microcell.
density is -174dB/Hz, and noise figure is 6dB. The bandwidth of an RB is 15kHz. The maximum D2D transmit
power pmaxi is 100mw and the maximum cellular transmit power is 500mw (27dBm). The close-in (CI) model
is used for Large-scale propagation [46], where non-line-of-sight (NOS) channels are assumed.10 The small-scale
fading is modeled by a Rayleigh fading channel with the channel response following CN (0, 1). The valuation
function used as an example here is vi(bi) = 1 − e−εibi [36], where bi can be ri (given by equation (14)) or ei
(given by equation (16)). Fig. 5 demonstrates the transmission rate and energy efficiency versus transmit power
when eight D2D links reuse an RB in a microcell in the aforementioned setup.
Example 1: An illustration of the results regarding dual pricing. Given vi(bi) = 1 − e−εibi , it is assumed
that links report based on a truthful εi when reporting truthfully. Eight curves, each corresponding to one D2D
link, are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. The curve for each link i represents the resulting utility (Fig. 6) and power
allocation (Fig. 7) under dual pricing versus the εi used by link i for reporting when other links report truthfully,
i.e., εj = εj , ∀j 6= i. 11 The solid hexagram marker on each curve marks the utility (Fig. 6) and power allocation
(Fig. 7) when the corresponding link also reports truthfully, i.e., εi = εi. From Fig. 6, it can be seen that reporting
truthfully does not yield the maximum utility for a link. This illustrates the fact that reporting truthfully is not EPIC,
as suggested by Theorem 1. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 jointly show that any utility larger than the utility given by truthful
reporting corresponds to an allocated power smaller than the allocated power in the case of truthful reporting. This
validates the result in Lemma 3.
Example 2: An illustration of SEM for two D2D links. In this simulation, link 1 adopts a valuation based on energy
10For D2D links and intra-cell interfering links, the urban micro-cellular street canyon scenario is adopted. For inter-cell interfering links, the
urban macro-cellular scenario is adopted.
11Each curve in Figs. 6 and 7 is supposed to be displayed in a separate plot. They are packed into two plots due to the limit of space. Each
curve is normalized by its maximum.
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Fig. 6: Untruthful reporting versus the resulting utility. Each curve corresponds to a specific user reporting
untruthfully on εi while others report truthfully.
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Fig. 7: Untruthful reporting versus the resulting power allocation. Each curve corresponds to a specific user reporting
untruthfully on εi while others report truthfully.
efficiency, and link 2 adopts a valuation based on rate. The parameter εi is generated from a uniform distribution
in [0.1, 0.3] for each link. The valuation of the network center used as as example here is ν(p) = ae−‖p−p
†‖2/σ.
The overall interference power from all sources at each D2D receiver is generated randomly in the range of 5dB
to 20dB of noise power. For each choice of the parameter α in SEM, 100 samples are used. The first plot in Fig. 8
shows the chance of successful exchange versus the center’s choice of α. The second plot in Fig. 8 shows the
average utility gain from an exchange for a microBS versus α. The figure illustrates the aforementioned trade-off
for the center, i.e., a larger α corresponds to a larger chance of success but a smaller utility gain.
Example 3: Illustration of ESEM. In this simulation, 20 D2D links are used, five of which use energy efficiency as
their objective, and the rest use data rate as their objective. The parameter εi is randomly generated from a uniform
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Fig. 8: (a) Probability of successful exchange and (b) average utility gain from an exchange for a microBS versus
α.
distribution in [0.1, 0.3]. The valuation of the microBS used as an example is ν = a exp(−‖p− p†‖/σ). The use
of such a valuation implies that the solution found via the ESEM is compared to the optimal solution p†, which
would be achieved by a virtual optimal mechanism that is efficient, budget-balanced, and incentive compatible.
The ESEM is implemented 50 times with a = 2, σ = 0.01. The traces of ν and ‖p − p†‖2 are shown in Fig 9.
A step size of δl = 10
−2 is used. Due to the randomness in choosing a candidate link in the ESEM, the traces
from different runs can be different. In Fig 9, the utility gain for the microBS from an exchange is limited due to
a small a and, as a result, it cannot provide enough subsidy for p to converge to p† (this can be seen from the
bottom subplot in Fig 9). However, despite of the difference in the traces, ν and ‖p−p†‖ at the output are almost
identical for each run. For example, the average ν at the final iteration in Fig 9 over the 50 runs is 1.9695 while
the difference between the maximum and the minimum ν is only 3.1% of this average. 12. The progress of utility
gain for all 20 D2D links in one run of ESEM is shown in Fig 10. It can be seen that the utilities of all links are
nondecreasing in ESEM, which illustrates the individual rationality property of ESEM.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Incentive for truthful reporting is studied for utility optimization problems with local information. The proposed
model allows each user to adopt an individual objective and a valuation function, incorporated as its local infor-
mation, and connects the optimization and the incentive perspectives. Dual pricing is shown to be not EPIC for
finding a solution to the UCP. With dual pricing, reporting truthfully is shown to be optimal for a user only when
the resource is over-supplied or when the user cannot afford any resource. If the network center intends to adopt a
solution different from the one accepted by the users, the solution needs to be also preferred by at least one user.
Otherwise, no incentive mechanism can specify a condition to guarantee the implementation of the solution and at
12With a larger choice of a, p can converge to p†. But this result is omitted due to limit of space.
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Fig. 9: Traces of ν and ‖p− p†‖ in 50 runs of ESEM (a = 2).
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Fig. 10: Traces of pii, ∀i in one run of ESEM (a = 2).
the same time guarantee truthful reporting. In the two-user case, whether such a solution can be implemented is
determined in one shot. In the multiuser case, the switch between solutions must go through an iterative process. The
proposed SEM and ESEM achieve incentive compatibility and provide nonnegative utility gains to both the users
and the center. Simulations for a D2D application scenario validate the analysis of dual pricing and demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed SEM and ESEM.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
When si = s
TR
i , x
⋆
i = x
⋆
i and λ
⋆ = λ⋆. From the primal optimality, the following result holds:
ui({sTRi , sTR−i }) = vi(x⋆i )− λ⋆x⋆i = sup
xi
(
vi(xi)− λ⋆xi
)
≥ vi(x⋆i )− λ⋆x⋆i = vi(x⋆i )− λ⋆x⋆i − (λ⋆ − λ⋆)x⋆i (19)
where λ⋆ and x⋆i are the final price and the allocation to user i when si 6= sTRi , respectively. If λ⋆ < λ⋆, i.e., user
i unilaterally drives the price higher, then it follows that −(λ⋆ − λ⋆)x⋆i ≥ 0 and
ui({sTRi , sTR−i }) = vi(x⋆i )− λ⋆x⋆i
≥ vi(x⋆i )− λ⋆x⋆i = ui({si, sTR−i }), (20)
where the strict equality holds when x⋆i > 0. Accordingly, user i achieves a less utility with such si 6= sTRi that
renders λ⋆({si, sTR−i }) > λ⋆({sTRi , sTR−i }). 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Define Di = [0,∞) if vi(xi) is nondecreasing and concave, and Di = [0, x∗i ] if vi(xi) is unimodal and concave
in [0, x∗i ], where x
∗
i maximizes vi(xi). For any given vi(xi) that satisfies the aforementioned properties (i.e.,
nondecreasing and concave in Di, twice-differentiable, and vi(0) = 0), a vi(xi) can be found such that vi(xi) <
vi(xi), ∀xi ∈ Di and v′i(xi) < v′i(xi), ∀xi ∈ Di. 13 Denote strategy si 6= sTRi as the strategy of reporting based on
vi. Four cases are possible.
Case i: v⋆j (si, s
TR
−i ) = v
⋆
j (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) = 0, ∀j 6= i. In this case, the following result holds:
λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i )
(a)
= v′i(x
⋆
i )
(b)
< v′i(x
⋆
i )=v
′
i(x
⋆
i )
(a)
= λ⋆(sTRi , s
TR
−i ), (21)
where the equalities with mark (a) follow from KKT conditions, and the inequality with mark (b) holds because
v′i(xi) < v
′
i(xi), ∀xi. 14 In this case, x⋆i (si, sTR−i ) = x⋆i (sTRi , sTR−i ) = Xmax.
Case ii: ∃j 6= i such that x⋆j (si, sTR−i ) > x⋆j (sTRi , sTR−i ) = 0. In this case, the following result holds:
λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i )
(a)
= v′j(x
⋆
j )
(c)
< v′j(0)≤v′i(x⋆i )
(a)
= λ⋆(sTRi , s
TR
−i ), (22)
where the inequality with mark (c) holds due to vj(xj) being strictly concave, and v
′
j(0) ≤ v′i(x⋆i ) holds because x⋆j
must be larger than zero and must satisfy v′i(x
⋆
i ) = v
′
j(x
⋆
j ) otherwise. In this case, x
⋆
i (si, s
TR
−i ) < x
⋆
i (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) =
Xmax.
Case iii: ∃j 6= i such that x⋆j (sTRi , sTR−i ) > x⋆j (si, sTR−i ) = 0. This case is impossible because it leads to the
following result:
λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i )
(a)
= v′i(x
⋆
i )≥v′j(0)
(c)
> v′j(x
⋆
j )
(a)
= v′i(x
⋆
i )
(a)
= λ⋆(sTRi , s
TR
−i ). (23)
13A simple example of such reporting strategy is using vi = αvi where α ∈ (0, 1).
14The same meanings apply for notations on the equality and inequality signs, respectively, in the rest of the proof.
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The result λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i ) > λ
⋆(sTRi , s
TR
−i ) infers
∑
j 6=i x
⋆
j <
∑
j 6=i x
⋆
j . The result v
′
i(x
⋆
i ) > v
′
i(x
⋆
i ) infers x
⋆
i < x
⋆
i
since v′i(xi) < v
′
i(xi), ∀xi ∈ Di. As a result, x⋆i +
∑
j 6=i x
⋆
i < x
⋆
i +
∑
j 6=i x
⋆
j ≤ Xmax, which occurs only if
λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i ) = 0 based on the KKT conditions. It contradicts with λ
⋆(si, s
TR
−i ) > λ
⋆(sTRi , s
TR
−i ). Therefore, this case
is impossible.
Case iv: x⋆j (si, s
TR
−i ) > 0 and x
⋆
j (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) > 0, ∀j. In this case, the effect of user i adopting si instead of sTRi
can be shown by contradiction. Suppose that λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i ) ≥ λ⋆(sTRi , sTR−i ). Then, it follows that:
v′j(x
⋆
j )
(a)
=λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i )≥λ⋆(sTRi , sTR−i )
(a)
=v′j(x
⋆
j )
(a)
=v′i(x
⋆
i )>0, (24)
λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i )
(d)
≥ v′i(x⋆i ), (25)
where the strict equality holds in step (d) if x⋆i (si, s
TR
−i ) 6= 0. From (24), it follows that x⋆j (si, sTR−i ) ≤ x⋆j (sTRi , sTR−i ), ∀j.
If the equality in step (d) applies, then v′i(x
⋆
i ) ≥ v′i(x⋆i ) based on (24) and (25). Using the property v′i(xi) <
v′i(xi), ∀xi, it follows that v′i(x⋆i ) < v′i(x⋆i ) ≤ v′i(x⋆i ). Since vi is strictly concave, it follows that x⋆i (si, sTR−i ) <
x⋆i (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ). If the strict inequality in step (d) applies, if follows that:
x⋆i (si, s
TR
−i ) = 0 < x
⋆
i (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) (26)
as x⋆i (s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) 6= 0 in the lemma. Therefore, x⋆i (si, sTR−i ) < x⋆i (sTRi , sTR−i ) in either case. Since x⋆j ≤ x⋆j , ∀j, it
leads to the result that
x⋆i +
∑
j 6=i
x⋆i < x
⋆
i +
∑
j 6=i
x⋆j ≤ Xmax, (27)
which happens only if λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i ) = 0. It contradicts with λ
⋆(si, s
TR
−i ) ≥ λ⋆(sTRi , sTR−i ) > 0. Therefore, the
assumption λ⋆(si, s
TR
−i ) ≥ λ⋆(sTRi , sTR−i ) must be invalid, which proves λ⋆(si, sTR−i ) < λ⋆(sTRi , sTR−i ) in this case.
Summarizing the above four cases concludes the proof. 
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Since it is impossible that x⋆l = 0, ∀l, there must exist at least one user, denoted as user i, and a corresponding
si 6= sTRi so that λ⋆(si, sTR−i ) < λ⋆(sTRi , sTR−i ) according to Lemma 2. Moreover, based on the four cases in the
proof of Lemma 2, the impact of si satisfies x
⋆
i ≤ x⋆i in all possible cases. Given that λ⋆ < λ⋆, x⋆j ≥ x⋆j , ∀j 6= i
and the strict inequality holds if x⋆j 6= 0. Two cases are possible.
Case i: max
j
v′j(0) < λ
⋆. As a result, ∃si such that λ⋆ ∈ [max
j
v′j(0), λ
⋆), x⋆j = 0, ∀j 6= i, and x⋆i = x⋆i .
Accordingly, the following result holds
ui(si, s
TR
−i ) = vi(x
⋆
i )− λ⋆x⋆i = vi(x⋆i )− λ⋆x⋆i
> vi(x
⋆
i )− λ⋆x⋆i = ui(sTRi , sTR−i ). (28)
Case ii: max
j
v′j(0) ≥ λ⋆. As a result, ∃j 6= i such that x⋆j > x⋆j , ∀λ⋆(si, sTR−i ) < λ⋆. Define
I−i = {j|j ∈ U/{i}, x⋆j > x⋆j}, (29a)
U−i = {j|j ∈ U/{i}, x⋆j = x⋆j}. (29b)
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Since x⋆j ≥ x⋆j , ∀j 6= i, I−i ∪ U−i = U/{i}. Given x⋆i < x⋆i , x⋆j > x⋆j for j ∈ I−i, and x⋆j = x⋆j for j ∈ U−i,
denote x⋆i = x
⋆
i −∆xi and, accordingly, x⋆j = x⋆j +∆xj , ∀j ∈ I−i, where ∆xi > 0,∆xj > 0,∆xi =
∑
j∈I−i
∆xj .
Pick any j with λ⋆ = v′j(x
⋆
j ) from I−i. Suppose that Lemma 3 is not true. The following result must hold:
ui(s
TR
i , s
TR
−i ) = vi(x
⋆
i )−v′j(x⋆j )x⋆i
≥vi(x⋆i −∆xi)−v′j(x⋆j+∆xj)(x⋆i −∆xi)
= ui(si, s
TR
−i ) (30)
for all possible ∆xi such that x
⋆
i = x
⋆
i − ∆xi falls in Di. Let ∆xi → 0, reformat (30), and take limit on both
sides. The following result holds:
lim
∆xi→0
vi(x
⋆
i )−vi(x⋆i −∆xi)
∆xi
≥ lim
∆xi→0
(
x⋆i
v′j(x
⋆
j )−v′j(x⋆j+∆xj)
∆xj
∆xj
∆xi
+v′j(x
⋆
j+∆xj)
)
. (31)
Since vi are twice differentiable in Di, the above result can be rewritten as
v′i(x
⋆
i ) ≥ −v′′j (x⋆j )x⋆i γji + v′j(x⋆j ) > v′j(x⋆j ), (32)
where γji = lim
∆xi→0
∆xj/∆xi. The second inequality is due to the fact that vi, ∀i is strictly concave, and x⋆i and
γji are both positive values. However, (32) contradicts with v
′
i(x
⋆
i ) = λ
⋆ = v′j(x
⋆
j ).
This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
D. Proof of Lemma 4
A mechanism is either one-shot or iterative. The following cases are possible.
Case i: one-shot, center initiates. In this case, center proposes a transfer ti, user i decides to accept it or not
based on the comparison between vi(x
⋆
i ) − vi(x†i ) and ti. Truthful reporting is optimal for user i. However, since
the center has no information on vi, it is impossible to guarantee ti > vi(x
⋆
i )− vi(x†i ) in one shot. Consequently,
no condition can be found to guarantee that ν(x†)− ν(x⋆) ≥∑i ti.
Case ii: one-shot, user initiates. In this case, user i proposes a ti based on vi(x
†
i ) − vi(x⋆i ), center decides to
accept it or not based on sc −
∑
i
ti = ν(x
†) − ν(x⋆) −∑
i
ti. Truthful reporting is optimal for user i only if
the maximum ti acceptable to the center, denoted as t
a
i , satisfies t
a
i ≤ vi(x⋆i ) − vi(x†i ). However, x† cannot be
implemented if tai < vi(x
⋆
i ) − vi(x†i ) while ti happens to equal tai in one shot is impossible given that user i has
no information on ν.
Case iii: iterative, center initiates. In such case, truthful reporting is optimal only if the center uses a fixed total
tT =
∑
i
ti =
∑
i
(vi(x
⋆
i ) − vi(x†i )) and adjusts the division of tT to t1 and t2 through the iterations. If the users
know tT =
∑
i
ti =
∑
i
(vi(x
⋆
i ) − vi(x†i )) in all iterations, truthful reporting is optimal for everyone. However, it
is impossible for the center to figure out such tT and use it in every iteration since vi is local information. Any
tT >
∑
i
ti leads to untruthful reporting. Any t
T <
∑
i
ti cannot implement x
†. A varying tT across iterations leads
to either untruthful reporting or fail of implementing x†.
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Case iv: iterative, user initiates. Reporting is not truthful in such case because user i proposes different ti through
the iterations, which cannot all be equal to vi(x
†
i )− vi(x⋆i ).
In summary, a mechanism cannot simultaneously be incentive compatible and guarantee the implementation of
x† when x†i ≤ x⋆i , ∀i. 
E. Proof of Lemma 5
The utility gain for the users, as a function of quotes ρ and ϕ, from participating in the procedure in Algorithm 1
is
pi1(ϕ, ρ) =
(
(ϕ+ αsc)− ρTR
)+
(33a)
pi2(ϕ, ρ) =
(
ϕTR − (ρ− αsc)
)+
(33b)
where ρTR = v1(x
⋆
1)− v1(x†1) and ϕTR = v2(x†2)− v2(x⋆2). The superscript (·)+ represents the projection onto the
nonnegative orthant. The values ρTR and ϕTR represent the true cost for user 1 and the true gain of user 2 in the
exchange, respectively. The projection reflects the fact that an exchange is made only if ϕ+αsc ≥ ρ. The reported
and the true values satisfy ρ ≥ ρTR and ϕ ≤ ϕTR for any rational users.
DSIC is achieved if pi1(ϕ, ρ) ≤ pi1(ϕ, ρTR), ∀ρ, ∀ϕ and pi2(ϕ, ρ) ≤ pi2(ϕTR, ρ), ∀ϕ, ∀ρ. From (33a) and (33b), it
can be seen that pi1(ϕ, ρ) is in fact independent on ρ, and pi2(ϕ, ρ) is independent on ϕ. Therefore, when ϕ+αsc ≥ ρ,
it holds that pi1(ϕ, ρ) = pi1(ϕ, ρ
TR), ∀ϕ and pi2(ϕ, ρ) = pi2(ϕTR, ρ), ∀ρ. Meanwhile, from the perspective of user 1,
the chance that ϕ+αsc ≥ ρ is smaller than the chance that ϕ+αsc ≥ ρTR for any ρ > ρTR. Therefore, reporting
a ρ with ρ > ρTR does not increase pi1(ϕ, ρ) when an exchange is made but increases the chance of no exchange,
in which case pi1(ϕ, ρ) = 0 ≤ pi1(ϕ, ρTR). Similarly, reporting a ϕ with ϕ < ϕTR does not increase pi2(ϕ, ρ)
when an exchange is made but increases the chance of no exchange, in which case pi2(ϕ, ρ) = 0 ≤ pi2(ϕTR, ρ).
Therefore, pi1(ϕ, ρ) ≤ pi1(ϕ, ρTR), ∀ρ, ∀ϕ and pi2(ϕ, ρ) ≤ pi2(ϕTR, ρ), ∀ϕ, ∀ρ regardless of whether the condition
ϕ+ αsc ≥ ρ is satisfied or not.
Individual rationality follows from the fact that pi1(ϕ, ρ) ≥ 0 and pi2(ϕ, ρ) ≥ 0 based on (33a) and (33b). 
F. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof for individual rationality follows the same logic as that in the proof of Lemma 5 and is omitted. Proof
of incentive compatibility is given as follows. Truthful Report means that
ρli = vi(x
l
i)− vi(xli − δl), i ∈ Sl1 (34a)
ϕlj = vj(x
l
j + δ
l)− vj(xlj), j ∈ Sl2. (34b)
We prove that it is optimal for user i, i ∈ Sl1, to report truthfully assuming other users do the same. The proof for
j ∈ Sl2 follows the same logic. Denote a report not necessarily truthful as ρli.15 All other users report truthfully.
Denote the resulting matrix Wl when user i reports ρl
i
as Wl(ρl
i
). Denoted the events that user i = i˜ (i.e., row i of
15It is assumed by default that i ∈ Sl
1
in the rest of the proof.
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Wl is selected in the fifth step of Algorithm 2) and i 6= i˜ with report ρl
i
as Ci(ρ
l
i
) and C¯i(ρ
l
i
), respectively. Two
cases are possible.
Case i: ρl
i
6= ρli but Wl(ρli) = Wl(ρli). In such case, the probabilities of Ci(ρli) and Ci(ρli) are equal. The
selection of j˜ given the event Ci(ρ
l
i
) is independent on the ρl
i
given that Wl(ρl
i
) = Wl(ρli). Moreover, the utility
gain
pili(ρ
l
i
) = αlθl
ij˜
+ ϕl
j˜
− ρli (35)
is independent on ρl
i
. Therefore, pili(ρ
l
i
) = pili(ρ) assuming Ci(ρ
l
i
) and pili(ρ
l
i
) = pili(ρ) = 0 assuming C¯i(ρ
l
i
). It can
also be observed that ρl
i
in such a case will not have an effect that propagates into any future iteration.
Case ii: ρl
i
6= ρli and Wl(ρli) 6= Wl(ρli). In this case, three sub-cases are possible.
Sub-case ii-1: i = i˜ with both ρl
i
and ρli, and W
l
i,j˜
(ρl
i
) = Wl
i,j˜
(ρli), i.e., the selected element is not affected by
untruthful report. In this sub-case, pili(ρ
l
i
) = pili(ρ
l
i).
Sub-case ii-2: Wl
i,j˜
(ρli) = 1 and W
l
i,j˜
(ρl
i
) = 0. In this sub-case, pili(ρ
l
i
) = 0 ≤ pili(ρli). Moreover, as user i makes
the center believe that ρl
i
is a truthful report, the following result holds
ψt
ij˜
(ρti) = ϕ
t
j˜
+ αtθt
ij˜
− ρti
(a)
≤ ϕl
j˜
+ αlθl
ij˜
− ρli
(b)
= ϕl
j˜
+ αlθl
ij˜
− ρl
i
≤ 0 (36)
from the perspective of the center, where step (a) is based on the facts that ϕtj ≤ ϕlj , ρti ≥ ρli, and αtθti,j˜ < αlθli,j˜
when i˜ = i, ∀i ∈ Sl1 ∩ St1, ∀j ∈ Sl2 ∩ St2, ∀t > l such that δl = δt, and step (b) is based on the belief ρli = ρli.
16 Accordingly, ψt
ij˜
(ρti) ≤ 0 results in Wti,j˜(ρti) = 0, ∀t > l. Consequently, user i looses the opportunity to make
profitable exchange with user j˜ in all future iterations. Therefore, any such untruthful report ρl
i
is non-beneficial
for user i in the current and future iterations in this case.17
Sub-case ii-3: Wl
i,j˜
(ρli) = 0 and W
l
i,j˜
(ρl
i
) = 1. In this sub-case,
pili(ρ
l
i
) = αlθl
ij˜
+ ϕl
j˜
− ρli < 0. (37)
The impact of ρl
i
will not propagate into any future iteration since Wl+1
i,j˜
(ρl+1
i
) will be recalculated.
Summarizing Sub-cases ii-1 to ii-3, it can be seen that any change in an element of W(ρli) due to untruthful
reporting leads to the same or less utility gain for user i in Case ii.
Combining Case i and Case ii proves Theorem II. 
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